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I. WAGES DO NOT DETERMINE PRICES
1. Which Went Up First?
The big corporations oppose all demands for higher wages
by telling us that wage increases lead to price increases.
But, in spite of their skillful propaganda, the fact is that
higher wages do not cause higher prices.
This can be shown quite simply.
How do the corporations and trusts try to prove that wage
increases cause price increases? They say: "Look at the facts.
Before the war broke out in Europe in September, 1939,
prices were more or less in line with wages. After the war
broke out, especially after earl Harbor, wages went up. As
soon as this happened prices began to climb."
./
Now it is true that during the war period both wages and
prices went up.
But the important question is: Which went up first?
This is not at all the old question: which-came-first-thechicken-or-the-egg?
Suppose wages went up first and then prices. In that case
some kind of argument might be made out to "prove'" that
prices went up because wages went up. Even so, this would
not be a very strong arument. If one thing happens after something else, this is no proof that it happened because of something else. After the rooster awakes and crows in the morning, the suI\ begins to rise. Does this mean that the sun rises
b-ecause the rooster wakes up and crows?
The same thing is true of wages and prices during the war.
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Even if we assume that first wages increased and t.h at prices
only went up afterwards, this still would not prove that the
wage increases caused the price increases. Perhaps the prices
went up for a different reason~as they did.
But the actual fact is that wages did not go up before prices.
The opposite happened. First prices began to move up. Only
after this happened, did the trade unions , begin to ask for
wage Increases.
When the war broke out in Europe in September, 1939,
all workers in the main industries were working on the basis
of wage scales established before the outbreak of the war.
These wage scales did not change during the last four months
of 1939. In spite of this, food prices began to advance from
the very moment the war broke out. There was a slow, steady
climb in food prices during- September, October, November
and December, 1939. But no wage increases.
During 1940, food prices continued to move upwards. Still
no wage increases. In the summer of 1940 the prices of all
goods purchased by wage earners started to go higher than
they had been during the years from 1935 to 1939. Still no
increases in wage scales. As a matter of fact, the labor movemen,t was concerned during 1940 not so much with wage
scales as with the fact that there were still some ten million
unemployed workers. There were no important wage movements in any important industry in the United States during
1940. Beginning with 1941 the cost of living began to zoom
Up.1

But it was not until the Spring of 1941, a full year and a
half after prices had begun advancing, that the major trade
. unions in the mining and steel industries began demanding
wage Increases.
Thus the corporations lie when they' say that prices went
up during the war because wages went up. Actually prices
moved upwards for a year and a half before the major trade
unions got any wage increase. I t was because prices had al-
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ready increased, resulting- in an actual wage cut for workers,
that the trade unions began demanding wage increases.

2. Which Went Up Faster?
That is how it has been ever since. ·The fight for higher
wages has been a desperate effort to catch up with the dizzy
spiral of prices.
Let's look at the record.
During 194 2 , the War Labor Board established the f~mous
Little Steel Formula. This froze all wages at a level 15 per
cent above that which existed in January, 1941. The only
exceptions were those raises required to eliminate sub-stan~
ard. rates of pay and wage differentials as well as those granted
for individual merit and length of service promotions . .These
exceptions added up to an additional 5 per cent. 2
Thus, during more than four and a half yeats {rom January, 1941 to July, 1945, the average manufacturing workers'
basic rate of pay went up by 20 per cent at a maximum.
But during this same period, according to government estimates, living costs rose by a total of 40 per centl 3
In other words, wages never caught up with prices.
What happened after the war ended?
Living costs increased 16.8 per cent from January, 1945 to
. October, 1946. By the end of 1946, the cost of living was about
20 per cent higher than it was in January, 1945, two years before. In terms of real wages, that is, what the worker can
actually buy with his wages, this represents a wage cut of
17 per cent. 4
Thus the fight for wage increases is, in reality, an attempt
to catch up with the astronomical rise in the cost of living.

3. The Argument About "Labor Costs"
. The corporations try to convince us . that it is only natural
and logical that wage increases should cause price in-creases.
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They say: "Wag~s make up the labor cost of every article.
It stands to reason that if wages-or labor costs-go up, the
cost of producing the article must also go up. Therefore,
wage increases must lead to prite increases in every industry
"in which there is a wage increase."
Sounds logical, doesn't it? Especially. if you say it very fast.
But you must say it very, very fast; otherwise the logic goes
into the sewer.
Let's try saying it a little more slowly so we can prevent
somebody from picking our pockets while we are saying it. ""
Let us assume, just for the sake of argument, that wage
increases do cause price incre"ases.
The first thing that must be noted is that an increase in
hourly wage rates does ~ot result in a corresponding increase
in unit labor costs because of increased productivity: Very
large increases in wages may result either in very small increases in unit labor costs or in" no increase in labor costs
whatsoever. For example, the Temporary National Economic
Committee showed that in a cert(;lin paper company "wage
rates increased 19 per cent between 1936 and 1938; yet because of a number of improvements in the paper making
machines, labor casts per ton of paper increased only 6 per
cent. 5 Had still further improvements been made, the labor .cost would not have increased at all. In view of the increase
in productivity during and after the war, it is obvious that
increased hourly rates could not lead to corresponding increases in unit costs.
In the second place, the actual increase in straight time
hourly earnings has not "resulted in a corresponding increase
in hourly labor costs to the employers. During the war, hourly labor costs to employers were higher than hourly straight
time earnings because of overtime. If a ,vorker got a straight
time rate of one -~ollar an hour during an eight hour day
and worked " only eight hours, the hourly labor cost to the
eluployer was one dollar. But if the lvorker put in two extra
8

hours overtime, he got one dollar and fifty cents for each
of those two hours. This means that it cost the employer
eleven dollars for ten hours work. Thus, the hourly labor
cost was higher than the hourly straight time rate of pay because of overtime.
With the end of the war, overtime has .been almost completely eliminated. As a result, even though there has been
an increase in straight time hourly earnings, the 'increase in
hourly labor costs has been much smaller. Straight time
hourly e,:\rnings have increased since January, 1945 by 12.7
cents. But, as a result of the elimination of overtime, hourly
labor costs to the employer have increased by only· 8.6 cents. 6
This increase in hourly labor costs represents an increase of
only 8.2 per cent since January, 194.5. 7
But the increase in the wholesale price of manufactured
goods during this period was 27.9 per cent.!S
Obviously the increased hourly labor cost was not .responsible for such an increase in prices.
In the third place, labor costs are. only a small part of the
production cost of a specific article. The Federal Trade Commission, in 1940, studied more than 2-,500 companies in 84
different industries and found that wages made up only about
25 per cent of the production cost of the average' article.
Therefore, increase in wages do not result in corresponding
increases in production costs. For example, a 25 per cent incre.ase in wages and salaries would represent only an increase
of one-:fourth, or 6y.i per cent, in cost of production. If this
i~crease in prodl:lction costs were entirely added to the price
of the article, the price should increase by only 6y.i per cent
of the cost of production.
.
.In other words, even accordiug to this argument, very large
wage increases should lead to very small price in~reases.
But actually, very small wage increases have been aCCOffip~nied by very large price increases.
9
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4. Behold the

S~owhall!

Since the argument about labor costs is so obviously weak,
the corporations have lately attempted to explain the huge
increase in prices by a new version of the labor cost theory.
This "explanation" has been presented by E. A. Evans,
a hired scribbler for th~ anti-labor Scripps-Ho'ward newspaper
chain as follows:
Assume that an automobile company's direct wage-salary bill-the payroll for its own employees-is one-fourth
of its production costs. A 25 per cent wage increase, if
paid by .o nly that one company among all the hundreds of
thousands of companies, would justify an increase of
only one-fourth of 25 per cent in the price of its produ'tt.
But whether its own product is automobiles or whatever, each manufacturing company has to buy the products of many others. And general wage increases, such
as the C.I.O .. demands for its unions' members, increase
the labor costs of all manufacturing companies'. . . .
So wage costs become a factor in prices, not once, but
time after time, at each step as the rawest materials-metal
ores underground, for instance-move through the factories of many manufacturers and become products for
sale to consumers. . . .
.
When wages are raised all along the line, labor costs
snowball at each step. (N. Y. World-Telegram, Jan. 6,
1947)
After this recital, you probably begin to wonder why the
price of an automobile has not quadrupled since the beginning of the war!.
The!e is one simple fa,ct which puts .a very narrow limit to
how far Mr. Evans' snowball can roll.
That fact is the following: The price which an auto manufacturer, for example, pays for his steel, accessories, parts,
tires, batteries, glass, etc., includes all the wages which w~e
paid out in all factories for the manufacture of these materials. It does not matter if the materials used in making an
]0

auto came from a thousand different companies and from ten
thousand different companies before that . and from twenty
thousand companies before that. The fact remains that the
sum total of all wages paid out for the manufacture of these
materials can never be greater than the price which the auto
manufacturer pays for them.
On the contrary, it must at all times be considerably less
than this price. This is obvious. The price of these materials
includes not only their labor costs. It also includes other
costs such as depreciation, taxes, interest, rent, etc. In addition, it includes the profit which ' is .made by each company
that took part in manufacturing these materials .
.But for the sake of argument, let us assume that the entire ...
price of these materials is made up of the wage costs of previous states of manufacture. This is a ridiculous assumption,
but we make it in order to see just how big Mr. Evans' snow:
ball can get even under the most fantastic conditions:
Furthermore, for the sake of argument, let us also assume
.that the auto manufacturer has no other costs such as interest,
rent, depreciation, etc. In that case, the labor cost of manu. facturing an auto would be 100 per cent of the cost of production. A 25 per cent wage increase all the way down the
line would then ~;ead to a maximum increase of 25 per cent
in price. That is as far as the snowball can roll.
Even under these fantastic conditions, it is clear that when
there is a general wage increase. in all industries, prices would
never increase more than the percentage increase in wages.
In actual life, since January, 1945 there has been an average wage increase of only 13.1 per cent.9 Even if 100 per
:cent of the cost of production consisted of labor costs, a 13.1
per cent increase in wages could lead only to a 13.1 .per 'cent
in~rease in prices.
But the actual increase in wholesale prices of manufactured
goods .since January, 1945 has been 27.9 per cent!
Obviously even the snowball theory can't explain such a
)
rise in ·prices.
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It is clear from all this that wage increases do not explain
price increases. Clearly, something else is responsible for price.·
increases.
As a matter of fact, we admitted that increased labor costs
cause price increases only for the sake of argument. The result of the argument disproves the argument itself.

5. Wages and Prices Change Independently
Actually wages and prIces c ange independently of each
other.
Look at the facts.
Wages may go up and prices may go down. Take electric
refrigerators. Between 1935 and 1941 wages in the electric
refrigerator industry went up 25 per cent. Despite this the
price of a standard model electric refrigerator went down in
price in that period from $195 to $172.5°.10
Wages may go up and prices may remain the same. Take the
cement industry. Average hourly earnings in the cement industry in 1936 wet.e 58 cents, in 1937 they were 66 cents, in
1938 they were 69 cents. During those three years average
hourly earnings increased by almost 20 per cent as compared
with 1936. Yet the wholesale price of a barrel of Portland
cement remained fixed during all those three years· at $1.67.11
Wages may remain the same and p1'" ices may go down. Take
steel. Wages in the steel industry 1-'.- ere practically frozen from
1924 through 1929. In the Pittsburgh district common labor
was paid 44 cents an hour in 1924, and by 1929 the rate was
still 44 cents an hour. Average hourly earnings for all steel
workers were 64 cents in 1924. Six years later, in 1929, they
were 67 cents an hour-a total of three cents an hour higher
_after six years. 12 Despite this, the composite price of finished
steel decreased from $2.61 per 100 pounds in 1924 to $2.35
per 100 pounds in 1928.13
•
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Wages may differ between two plants and yet both may sell
their products for the same price. Take tires. The Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Company sells its tires at the same price
all over the country. But the wages which it pays in its
southern plants are from 15 tents to 50 cents lower than wages
paid for the same work in its northern . plants. 14
From this it is clear that wages ' do not determine prices.
And specifically, wage increases do not cause price increases.
Does it still sound strange? The~ think about it some more.
Those who say that wage increases cause price increases in
reality assume that the manufacturer can raise prices at his
own sweet will. They maintain that when he has to pay higher
wages, he decides to raise his price .
. However, if it were true that a manufacturer could raise
the pri'ce of his article whenever he felt like it, then he would
lose nothing if wages were raised. He would simply raise the
price of his article to cover the increase in w~ges.
But we know that the employer resists every demand for
higher wages. Obviously, this resistance means that he does lose
something when wages are raised. From what we know about
employers, the loss of honor, decency and virtue would not
disturb him in the least. There is only one thing whose loss
would send his blood pressure up-profits. It is because a
wage increase results in a cut in profit that the employer resists any wage increase.
Obviously, the employer himself does not believe his own
claptrap about wage increases causing price increases. If he
did, he would not 'a llow strikes to interrupt ' his pleasant routine of profit-making. He would grant the wage increases,
jack up the price to make up the dfference and let the profits
come pouring in uninterruptedly.
N either the small employer in a highly competItIve industry nor the giant monopoli~t believes in or acts upon the
principle that wage increases cause price increases.
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6. Prices Under Free Competition
What prevents the small employer from raising his price
every time he is compelled to grant a wage increase?
Why, the competition in his industry, of course. Let us assume ·he increased his price because of a wage increase. But
suppose his competitor kept the price of his article at its
original level. The competitor would sell his goods because
they were cheaper. Our dear employer would be unable to
sell his because: they were more expensive. Instead of making
a profit, he would soon go bankrupt. Hence, in order to meet
competition, he must cQntinue selling at the same price despite the fact that he has to pay higher V\rages. But when he
does this, he gets a lower profit.
Thus, the wage increase does not determine the price. It
affects the profit. Wage increases do not raise 'prices; they
cut profits.
.
Furthermore, if this manufacturer can raise the price of his
product every time he is compelled to raise wages, why must
he wait until he is ' forced to raise wages? '!\Thy doesn't he
simply raise the price every time he wants ·to? By doing that
he wOll'ld pocket the extra profit that came from a higher
price without giving any wage increase. Now, 'obviously, that
is exactly what he would do-if he could. The fact that he
doesn't under free competition proves not that he is unwilling.
Whoever heard of a capitalist unwilling to make some extra
profit? It proves that he can't.
But what about the big fellows, you ask? What about the
huge trusts, Inonopolies and cartels? They don't have to worry
about competition in their industries. "'That is to stop them
from raising prices every time they are compelled to 'give wage
increases?
That's a good clean-cut question.
The only trouble with it is this: If there is no competition in their industry to stop them from raising prices when
wages are increased then there is also no competition in their

industry to stop them from raising prices when wage are not
'increased.
And, up to a certain point, nothing does stop the ,

7. Monopoly Prices
Monopolies and trusts are not decisively influenced in setting their prices by wage levels. The main thing that determines the price of an article produced by a monopoly is its
opinion about what the traffic will bear. When the Mellon
family sets the price of a pound of aluminum, the most important question it asks is: What price can we get away with?
For example, bet~een 1925 and 1940 the price of ~ pound
of aluminum ingot was between 20 cents and 27 cents per
pound. But the cost of production including overhead, machinery, raw materials and labor was between 10 cents and
14 cents per pound. It is small wonder that Fortune Magazine
said: "In the past, the price of aluminum has borne little relation either to the amount sold or to the cost of producing
it."15

-

Take a look at the highly monopolized steel industry.
Last winter the Steel Union won an 18Y2¢ an hour wage
increase.
According to the steel trust, this extra labor cost had to be
transferred into the price of steel. Had . this been done, the
price of steel would have been raised $1 for every $1 that was
paid out in higher wages. But the steel trust demanded and
received from President Truman a price increase J of $2 for
every $1 they paid out in higher wages!
When the steel trust talks about wage increases being responsible for price increases, that's really something for the
book. The price policies of the steel trust are well known
for their disregard of very consideration but one-the maximum profit the traffic will bear.
The steel industry is notorious for its famous "break-even
point" price system. According to this system, the price of a
ton of steel is fixed so that a steel -corporation can just break

even when production is at 40 per ~ent of capacity. When
production goes up to 45 per cent it begins to make a "normal" profit. When production goes up to 60 per cent 'of ca'pacity the profit goes above "normal." When production goes
up to 80 per cent of capacity the profit becomes enormous.
And when production goes up to full capacity, as it did during the war, the profits are fabulous. 16
What does such a price policy mean?
When a steel plant operates at only 40 per cent of capacity,
the pro rata cost of overhead for the entire plant-including
the 60 per cent that is not working-is included in the price
of every ton of steel that is turned out . .Now when more than ·
40 per cent capacity is used, it means that steel is being turned
out without any additional overhead expenses. Despite this,
the price of a ton of steel remains the same. As a result, on
every additional ton of steel over 40 per cent capacity, the
cost of overhead is being charged twice. Furthermore, the
closer a steel plant comes to operating at capacity, the lower
do its unit labor costs fall. As a result, on every additional
ton of steel over 40 per cent of capacity the "labor cost" is
charged 1 ~ times, or 1 Y2 times or possibly even twice.
If wages determined prices, then the price of a ton of steel
should be reduced whenever a steel plant works at higher
than 40 per cent of capacity. But if you ever see that happen,
then you are a very sick person and better get yourself to a doctor fast. Anybody that can see thqt happen is also capable of
seeing pink elephants dancing with maroon colored butterflies.
No matter at what rate a steel plant works the price of a
ton of steel remains fixed despite the fact that the "labor
cost" of a ton of steel falls-as do its other costs of production.
And the steel trust tells us that vvages determine prices! That's
enough to make a horse laugh.
There are also other price-fixing arrangements whereby the
capitalists in certain indu~tries try to maintain an artificially
I
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high price LO offset Lhe effects of COlll petlllon. A. nunlber of
the most · important capitalists who control the bulk of the
output in a certain industry "ery often COlne to a written or
unwritten agreement to "peg" the price of their product at a
certain level regardless of the cost of production or the size
of the demand. This is known as "pegging" the price or
"rigging" the price.
,tVage levels or wage increases are not a decisive element in
fixing price levels or making price changes in a monopolized
industry. That is one of the reasons why the big capita~ists
try to abolish competition among themselves by forming
trusts, combines, holding companies and cartels. To the extent that monopolies abolish free competition in a certain
cently, Alcoa had no competition of any kind in the aluminum
industry of the United States. It ruled the roost.
What, then, prevents the monopolists from fixing their
prices at even more fantastic levels than they are today?
Because they don't have an absolutely clear field to themselves. .
Look at the Aluminum Corporation of America. This is
as perfect an example of a monpolized industry as was ever
seen since the beginning of the capitalist system. Up until recently, Alcoa had absolutely no competition of any kind in
the aluminum industry of the United States. It ruled the
roost.
But although, it had no competition within the aluminum
industry of the United States, it had to compete with other
industries in the United States. For example, it had to compete with the steel industry and the copper industry. If its
price were too high, manufacturers ""ould begin to use s~eel
or copper or other metals as a substitute. It also had to compete with European aluminun1 trusts which tried to invade
the American market by underselling the Aluminum Corporation of America.
Thus, monopoly does not elminate competition. It repro-
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duces competitIon on a gigantic scale between monopoly giants. The aluminum monopoly competes with steel monopolies, copper monopolies, etc. The auto trusts have reduced
competition to the point where three giant trusts-the Big
Three-virtually control the entire auto industry. But competition within the auto industry has not been completely
eliminated among the Big Three. Also, autos must compete
in the field of transportation with the bus and railroad in- ·
"' dustry. Coal for heating competes with oil for heating. The
lumber industry competes with the brick and _cement industry. All of them must compete with similar monopolies in
the worl~ market. And so it goes.
Thus, the elimination of free competition within an industry
makes it possible for the monopolists to raise prices with
slight regard for labor costs. But, among other things, the
competition between monopolies in different industries and
<>n the world market sets certain limits to the level of these
swollen monopoly prices. They are fixed to give the maximum
possible profit taking into account the probable size of the
demand at this price in contrast with the demand at a still
higher price. They are fixed to give the maximum possible
profit taking into account the effect at this price of competition with other monopolies or in the world market in contrast to the effect at a higher price of such competition.
Therefore, an increase in wages is not responsible for an increase in monopoly prices. The monopoli6S raise prices to
"compensate" for wage increases despite the fact that the level
of wages had very little to do with determining the original .
price in the first place. They do it because a wage increase
in a monopolized industry tends to cut down the exorbitant
size of the monopoly profit.
That is why all employers resist wage increases, no matter
l-vhether they are in a competitive industry or a monopolized
industry. They do so not because higher wages are responsible for higher prices but because higher wages reduce profits.
18

8. What Price Profit?

I

The real explanation for the dizzy increase in prices since
the end of 193'9 is to be found not in the wage increases of
the workers but in the mad thirst for profits of the monopolies.
The monopolies have taken advantage" of the shortage of
certain products to boost prices up to whatever the traffic will
bear. In cases where there have been no real shortages, the
monopolies have deliberately withheld products from the
market to create a shortage and force through a price increase.
That price increases have been caused by this super-duper
profiteering of th~ monopolies is pro, en by the profit picture
as revealed in the Nathan report.
"According to this report, corporate profits (after all taxes
were paid) reached fifteen billion dollars for the year 1946.
This is fifty per cent higher than the profits these same corporations made at the height of their war-time profiteering
in 19441 And as we all know, war production is usually the
most profitable kind of production for the capitalists.
It is seventy-five per cent higher than the profits made during 19291 And we all know that 1929 was up until now the
most profitable peace-time year in America's history.
It is two hundred and seventy-five per cent higher than the
average yearly profit during the years 1936-19391
If we compare the rate of growth of money, wages and
profit we find that total corporate profits since 1939 have increased much more rapidly than total wages and salaries. Corporate income, before taxes, are 290 per cent higher thah 1939
while wages and salaries are only 169 per cent higher. Hence
the relative position of the worker has sharply declined during this period.
The monopolists, taking full advantage of the special conditions of the <:ountry following the end of the war, increased
their rate of profit at the expense of the consumer by deliberately raising all prices.
''''hat price profit, friend?

ll. WHAT DETERMINES PRICES?
I. Straight From the Horse's Mouth
We have just seen that "vages do not determine prices. ~
. But we still don't know wha~ does determine prices.
Let's try to find out by going to someone who has the
"know-how'"-the manufacturer.
We ask Mr. Dough, the bicycle manufacturer: "How is the
price of your bicycle determined?"
He replies: "First I take the cost of my materials such as
tires, steel, machinery, etc. To this I add the cost of hiring
my workers. Then I -a dd my percentage of profit. The sum
total of all three determines the price of my bicycle."
Quite simple, is it not?
No, it is not. For nothing has been explaiJ?ed.
What we have been told is that the price of the bicycle is
determined by the price of a couple of other things.
Well, what determines the price of a couple of those "other
things," e.g., the tires?
.
Mr. Dough c~n't tell us. He refers us to Mr. Smith" who
manufactures the tires for first-hand information.
So we ask Mr. Smith, the tire manufacturer: "How is the
price of one of your tires determined?"
He replies: "First. I take the cost of my materials such as
rubber, fabric, machinery, chemicals, etc. To this I add the
cost of hiring my workers. Then I add my percentage of
profit. The sum total of all three determines the price 'of my
rubber tire."
'.
20

Now you have the answer, don't you?
No, you don't. For this also explains nothing.
What we have been told again is that the price of the tire
1_ is determined by the price of a couple of other things.
Well, what determines the price of a couple of these other
things, for example, the fabric?
Mr. Smith can't tell us. He refers us, in turn, to Mr. Jones
who manufactures the fabric.
So we ask Mr. Jones, the fabric manufacturer: "How is the
price of your fabric determined?"
He replies: "First I take the cost of my materials such as
cotton thread, machinery, etc. To this I add the cosf of
hiring my workers. Then I add my percentage of profit. The
sum total of all three determines the price of my cotton fabric. "
But, Mr. Jones, what determines the price of the cotton
thread?
Mr. Jones says: "You'd better ask Mr. Skinflint. He manufactures that."
It gets to be quite monotonous, doesn't it?
Mr. Dough refers us to Mr. Smith, who refers us to Mr.
Jones who refers us to Mr. Skinflint who no doubt will refer
us to someone else who in turn 'will refer us to stin another
person and so on indefinitely. We seem never to get anywhere.
The trouble is that we have been going in a circle. Suppose we try something else-for example, supply and demand.

2. Supply and Demand
We often hear it said that supply and demand determine
prIces.
Let's see. In what way do supply and demand influence
prices?
\Vhen demand is greater than supp~y, the price rises. When
supply is weater than demand, the price falls.
21

But the opposite is also true . Prices influence supply and
demand. When the price goe~ up, the demand begins to fall
because fewer and fewer people can afford to pay the higher
price. And when the demand begins to fall, the supply · begins to fall. Nobody likes to produce what can't be sold.
On the other hand, when the price goes down, the, demand
begins to increase because more and more people can afford
to buy at a lower price. And when demand begins to increase,
the supply begins to gro·w. Everybody likes to produce something that can be sold.
So we have the following result: Supply and demand influence prices. But prices also influence supply and demand.
Once more we find ourselves going around in a circle and
getting nowhere fast.
We agree that prices go up when demand is greater than
supply. We also agree that prices go down when supply is
_ greater than demand. But what happens when supply is
equal to demand? Obviously the price doesn't go up and
neither does it go down. It remains fixed at a certain point.
But what determiJ?es the point at which it is fixed?
This is where we came in in the first place.

3. What Do- We Mean By Price?
N ow let's try looking at it this way.
Just what do we. mean when we talk about the price of an
article?
Suppose the price of a hat is $5 and the price of a pair of
shoes is also $5. If I own a hat, I can sell it for $5. vVith
this five dollars I can buy the pair of shoes. In this "va y I
start out with a hat and wind up with a pair of shoes.
What have I really done?
I have really exchanged the hat for the shoes.
Therefore, when I say that the price of the hat is $5, I
really mean that it can be exchanged for a pair of shoes whose
price is $5. Or else, that it can be exchanged for five fountain
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pens whose price is $1 each. Or else that it can be exchanged
for ten watermelons whose price is fifty cents each. Or else,
it can be exchanged for twenty pounds of potatoes whose price
is a quarter a pound.
In other words, prices express in terms of money the proportion in which one article may be exchanged for another;
that is, its exchange value.
To find out what determines prices, we must first find out
what determines this exchange value.
Let us go back to the hat and the shoes . .
If one hat can be exchanged for one pair of shoes, the
value of the hat must be equal to the value of the shoes.
But if their values are equal, they must both have something in common which can be measured.
What is there in common between a hat and a pair of
shoes which can be measured to find out if they are equal to
each other in exchange?
. They are certainly not equal to each other because of their
weight; a hat is much lighter than a pair of shoes. _ They are
certainly not equal to each other because of their shape. They
are certainly not equal to each other because of their size.
They are certainly not equal to each other because of their
color. They are certainly not equal to each other because of
their materials. They are certainly not equal to each g.ther ·
in the uses to which they are put. In brief, they are not equal
to each other because of any physical property which they may
have.
There is only one feature which they both have in common which can be compared and measured. Both of them
are the products of human labor. A certain number of hours
of work was required to make the hat. Likewise, a certain
number of hours of work was required to make the shoes. That
is the only thing they have in common which can be measured
to determine if they are equal to each other in exchange.
Therefore, . the exchange value of an article is determined

by the hours of work required under average conditions of
skill and technique to prod~ce that article.
The price of an article merely expresses in terms of money
this exchange value of an article. Therefore, the price of ?n
article is, in tile last analysis determined by the amount of
work which is required ~o produce it.
It may sound strange to say this today.
But there was a time when it 'would have been strange to '
sa y anything else.
Centuries ago everybody determined the value of articles
they wanted to swap for others, or to sell for cash, by the
number of hours or days or weeks of work which it took to
produce those articles. They habitually measured the value
of a commodity by the amount of work it took to produ~e it.
In those days life was' so narrow, limited and simple that
everybody knew pretty accurately just how much work someone else had to put in to make or grow something. Most families raised, grew and made pretty nearly -all the necessities
of life right on their own farm. They not only grew their
own wheat but also milled that wheat into flour themselves
and baked it into bread in their own oven-':'which they themselves had built. They knew pretty g~nerally how much work
, was involved, on an average, in making a loaf of bread from
the time the seed was planted to the time the steaming loaf was
pulled from the oven. The same thing held true of clothes.
They grew their own flax, spun the flax into yarn, wove the
yarn into cloth and made their own clothing-called homespun.
Even as far as other crafts were concerned, all worked under the public inspection of everyone else in the small villages and towns. The village blacksmith could see the vnlage carriage maker work across the street. ~h~ village cabinetmaker could see the village candlemake~ next door. The
shoe~aker, carrying his t901s with him, would make periodic
trips to outlying farms where he would make complete paIrs
24
I

of ·shoes right outside the farmhouse door under the watchful
gaze of the housewife.
Therefore, as a result of long experience the determination
of the value of a commodity according to the amount of work
it took to produce it was a comparatively simple matter. If,
roughly, it t~ok two days to chop down a tree, peel off its
bark, saw the tree into suitable lengths, and make a dresser;
while roughly, it took eight days to go through . the same
process in order to make a wagon, then the price of a wagon
would tend to be four time~ as high as the price of a dresser.
When a man sold an article, he got gold or silver for it. In
other words, he exchanged his article for a certain amount of
gold or silver. In making this exchange, the only new question
involved was to make a more or less correct estimate of how
much work was required to mine or refine an ounce or a
pound of gold or silver. As far as metal coins were concerned,
a shilling or a crown or a franc was simply the name for so
many ounces of the precious metal contained in the coin.
Sometimes, of course, when the demand was greater than
. the . supply, the price would rise abo, e the value as determined by the working time necessary to Inake the commodity.
Sometimes when the supply was greater than the demand,
the price would fall below its true value. But, in general, the
prIce fluctuated around that value.

4. Benjamin Franklin and Karl Marx . ;
The first American thinker to study this question and write
about it was the celebtated founding father of our country,
Benjamin Franklin. He wrote in 1721 as follows:
By labor may the value of silver be measured as well as
other things. As suppose one man employed to raise corn
while another is digging and refining silver; at the year's
end, or at any other period of time, the complete 'produce
of corn, and that of silver, are the natural price of 'e ach
other; and if one be twenty bushels, and the other twenty
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ounces, then an ounce of that silver is worth the labor of
raising a bushel of that corn. Now) if by the discovery of
some nearer, more easy or plentiful mines, a man may get
forty ounces of silver as easily as formerly he did twenty,
and the same labor is still required to raise twenty bushels
of corn, then two ounces of silver "vill be worth no more
than the same labor of raising one bushel of corn, and
that bushel of corn will be as cheap at two ounces, as it
"vas before at one, ceteris paribus. Thus the riches of a
country are to be valued by the . quantity of labor its inhabitants are ab1e to purchase .. '.. Trade, in general being
nothing else but the exchange of labor for labor, the
value of all things is, as I have said before, most justly
measured by labor.17
4

I

In other words, Ben Franklin said that the value of a
bushel of corn was determined by the amount of time a farmer
worked to raise it and bring it to market. It took him as much
working time, on an average, to raise a bushel of com as it
took a silver miner to dig and refine an ounce of silver. Therefore, . a bushel of corn "vas worth an ounce of silver. If there
were an ounce of silver , in a British shilling in those days,
the price of a bushel of corn would be equal to one shilling.
" What Benjamin Franklin said in 17"21 was the product of
his own direct experience. Franklin was above all a practical
man. His opinions and ideas were based on a shrewd practical
insight into the behavior and" activities of people and things.
He generalized this practical insight into a theoretical explanation of value and price.
Benjamin Franklin's opinions were one of the first bril- "
liant expositions of what later became known as the labor
theory of value. This theory maintains that the value of commodities is- determined by the "working time which is necessary for society, on the average; to produce those commodities.
It maintains that the price of a commodity is nothing bl:lt its
value expressed in terms of mOl1ey. Therefore, the price of a
commodity is, in the last analysis, determined by the working
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time which is necessary, on the average, to produce that commodity.
.
This labor theory of value, which ,Benjamin franklin was
one of the first to advance, became one of the ·cornerstones of
Karl Marx's socialist theories. Of course, Karl Marx put this
theory on a scientific basis and Iound the answer to many
questions which Ben Franklin could not solve. But the pioneering character of Franklin's observation was an important
contribution to human thought. In fact Karl Marx says the
following about Benjamin Franklin:
The first sensible analysis of exchange value as labortime, made so clear as to seem almost commonplace, is to
be found in die work of a man of the New World where
the bourgeois relations of production imported together
with their representatives sprouted rapidly in a soil which
made up its lack of historical traditions with a surplus of
humus. That man was Benjamin Franklin, who formulated the. fundamental law of modern political economy
in his first work which he wrote when a mere youth and
published in 1721.18
What, oh what, will the Daughters of the American Revolution say to this!
As gold and silver began more and more to be used as a
medium of exchange people began to estimate the value of an
article in terms of so many ounces of silver or gold instead of
so many hours or days of work. But actually when they estimated that a bushel of corn was worth an ounce of silver,
they did so because the labor time ~ecessary to produce a
bushel of corn and an ounce of silver was same.
Later still, when governments began to coin money such
as ducats, shillings, francs, golden eagles, etc., people began to
estimate the value of an article in terlns of certain coins instead of so many ounces of gold or silver. They stopped saying
- that a bushel of corn ,vas "vorth' an ounce of silver and began
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say that a bushel of corn was worth a shilling. But actually,
when they estimated that a bushel of corn was worth a shilling,
they did so because there was an ounce of silver in a shilling.
It was merely a different form of saying that a bushel of corn
was worth an ounce of silver.
People stopped thinking in tenns of precious metals and
began to think exclusively in terms of prices. They did so not
only because the use of gold and silver gave way to coins and
other forms <:>f money but because it beca~e more and more
diffilc ult to estimate how much work was involved in producing certain articles.
Especially in modern times, under highly developed capitalism, conditions are vastly different from what they were in
Ben Franklin's day, or the centuries before. None of us can
tell from our own direct, everyday experience just how much
working time is involved in the manufacture of even the most
commonplace articles-an auto, or a watch, or a loaf of bread.
Nevertheless, the fact is that today-just as 200 or 500 or
1,000 years ago-the value of a commodity is determined by
the amount of working time it takes to produce it. The law of
value operates behind our backs, so to speak, without our
being consciously aware of it.
It was the gre·a t genius of Karl Marx which made it possible for us to penetrate beneath the complexity of the modern capitalist system of prices and to demonstrate that the
basic law of value still operates-th~ law which states that the
value of an article is determined by the amount ·of working
time which it took to produce it and that price is simply the
expression of this value in terms of money_
This law operates today for society as a whole as a law of.
ave,r ages.This means that the average price of articles over
long periods of time is determined by the average amount of
work it takes society as a whole to produce them.
This is why, over long. periods of time, over many decades,
the price of all articles tends to fall. The price tends to fall
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because productivity continually grows, that is, less and less
work is required to produce articles. , But the amount of work which it takes to produce an article
is a very different thing from the amount of money a worker
gets as wages.
So long as it takes the same amount of work to produce an
article, the value will remain the same, and the price will tend
to remain the same.
.
But that doesn't stop wages from going up or down.
On the other hand, it may take less work to produce an
article. In that case the value will decline, and the price will
tend to fall.
But that doesn't stop wages from going up or down or remaining the same.
This explains the facts we presented in the first part of
this pamphlet. Those facts proved that in actual life prices
and wages may change independently of each other. The law
of value explains why this is possible.
The law of value proves that wages do not determine prices
because prices are determined !lot by wages, but by some- '
thing else-by the value of the article.

III. SHOULD LABOR FIGHT FOR
WAGE INCREASES?
1. The Productivity Wage Policy
The €orporations say:
"Don't ask for wage increases now. - The -only way
to increase real wages is to lower prices by increasinE" productivity. Help us increase productivity; and you will automatically get higher real wages."
This is also - the wage policy of the reactionary top leadership of the A. F. of L.
One would think that there had been no increase in productivity during the past few years and hence that wages can't
be increased today without increasing prices.
But productivity in all manufacturing ,industries increased
on an average about 5 per cent per year from 1941 to 1944·
The total increase in productivity during this period was
19 per cent, according to the War Production Board.
Why haven't we gotten lower prices and, therefore, higher
real wages as a result of this increased productivity? "The war," they say, "It's because this increase in productivity took place in industry producing war materials. Increased productivity in making 30-~in. shells or 50-ton tanks
doesn't'mean anything for wages and prices today. Not many
workers produce them, and certainly the . general -public
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doesn't buy them. What ,ve have to do is increase productivity
of peace-time industry. War time increases in productivity
can't be passed along to peace-time indus try."
They lie again. More than three-quarters of all production
during th~ war years 1942, 1943 and 1944 was on products
which are used not only during war but also during peacetime. About half of all production and construction carried
out on war contracts was likewise on products which are
used during peace-time such as autos, trucks, radios, gasoline,
etc. The increase in productivity in these products should
affect wages and prices now. But it doesn't.
In addition, the war ended more than a year and a half ago.
Has nothing happened since then?
The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that production per man rose in 1945 over 1944. The Federal Reserve
Board declared that in the majority of industries productivity
i shigher than before the war. The U. S. News ' (October 4,
1946), stating that 'a further and faster rise in productivity is
indicated for 1947, predicted that productivity will rise in ' the
first half of 1947 to a peak about 25 per cent above the 1939
level. The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics calculated in January, 1946 that productivity by 1950 would be 30 per cent
higher than in 1940.
Thus productivity increased dUTing the war. It is continuing
to increase today. It will continue to increase in the future .
. If inq-eased productivity automatically results in higher
real wages through lower prices, it should have had that result already. But it hasn't:
Obviously, increased productivity doesn't automatically
low~r prices.
Perhaps the trouble is that we have been discussing war
years. What about a peace-time period?
Let us take the eight year peace-time period between 19 22
and 1929During this period productivity In manufacturing indus-
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tries increased by more than 25 per cent. If productivity auto. matically results in an increase in real wages through a decrease in prices, there should ha, e been quite a substantial
increase in real wages during these eight years. Nothing of
the kind happened. Prices as .a whole did not go down during
those years. They actually increased somewhat. In 1922 retail
prices were 49 per cent higher than they had been in the years
. preceding the World War 1. In 1929 they were 53 p~r cent
higher. In other words, retail prices in 1929 were higher than
in 19 22 despite the fact that productivity had increased. 19
What about money wages during this period? Perhaps the
increased productivity resulted in higher money wages instead of lower pric'es?
The ~ ational Industrial Conference Board, a big business
organization, gives us the answer to that one straight from
the horse's mouth. According to it, the average hourly earn'. ings of workers in 25 different manufacturing industries were
56 cents an hour in 1924. In 1929, they were 59 cents an hour.
In other words, average hourly earnings in these industries
had increased about one-half cents an hour each year for those
six years. This, was a total increase over six years of about
5 per cent or less than 1 per cent per year. 20
These are the facts . .
They make all the corporation dou bletalk about ~ncreasi ng
real wages by greater productivity look pretty sick.
What the ' corporations mean when they ask the worker to
cooperate in raising productivity is to submit voluntarily to
speed-up. The corporations don't need any cooperation from
workers in raising productivity by introducing new machines
or making technological improve,m en ts on existing machines.
Whenever a corporation thinks it will be more profitable to
install a new machine, thus increasing productivity, it does so
without asking for the "cooperation" of the· worker.
But there is more than one way of skinning a cat. Output
may also be increased by speeding-up the worker without
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introducing any new machines or technical processes. This
method of increasing output is well-known to all wor~ers and
hated by them. In its most developed form it is known as the
Taylor system or the Bedaux system .. In the textile industry it
is known as the "stretch-out." Speed-up increases outpu.t by
burning out the workers. At forty he is ready for the scrap
heap.
.
This is the kind of increased output the corporations prefer. They hate to lose the millions of dollars they ~ave invested
in machinery and equipment by throwing them on the scrap
heap whenever a newly invented machine renders them obsolete. They would rather speed up the worker and throw him
<}n the scrap heap when he is all burned out. Workers are
cheap-machines cost a lot of money.
In fact, it is quite laughable to hear the big trusts and corporations talk about their great love for increaseq productivity. They are among the most important forces for hindering
and delaying the introduction of new machinery and processes.
They buy up patents and sit on them for years to prevent anybody from using them until their own original investment is
paid back. They introduce new machinery and new processes
only when it is more profitable to them no Inatter how. much
this delay prevents any increase in productivity .
. As a matter of fact, it is not the high level of technique and
productivity which has produced the boasted "high standard
of living" in the United States compared with other countries.
It is the other way around. Historically, wages were relatively
higher in the United States than in European countries because if a worker didn't like his wages in the early days he
could pack up and get himself a homestead in the West. This
high level o~ wages and shortage of workers stimulated the
search for and introduction of l~bor-saving machinery by
American employers. Historically, therefore, it was not productivity which led to relatively high wages but these reI at~vely high wages which led to ever greater produc~ivity. Later
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on, when it was no longer possible for a worker to pack up
and go out West, it was only as a result of giga~tic strike
struggles that these relatively high wages were prevented from
being cut to the same level as in other countries.
What does increased productivity result in?
Its only inevitable and automatic result -is to reduce the
labor cost of each unit produced. If a hand loader in a coal
mine gets ten dollars a -day and loads ten tons a day, then the
labor cost of loading a ton of coal is 'one dollar. If a loader
operating a mechanical loader gets ten dollars a day and loads
twenty tons a day, then the labor cost of loading a ton of coal
is fifty cents a day. The productivity of the loader has doubled.
As a result the labor cost of loading a ton of coal has been out
by 50 per cent. If the prodttctivity of all categories of miners
-loaders, shot-firers, motormen, check-weighmen, insp~ctors,
etc.-was likewise doubled, then the total labor cost of a ton
of coal would likewise be reduced by 50 per cent.
That's all that happens automatically.
After that, it dependsIn a highly competitive industry like bitumin0us coal mining, increased productivity results in lower prices for coal. A
coal operator who mechanizes his mine gets a bigger profit on
each ton of coal because his labor cost on each ton of coal is
reduced. He can, therefore, reduce his price per ton of coal
below the general market pr:ice and continue making the same
profit per ton of coal that other operators make who : sell at
the regular market price. In order to keep their customers,
the other operators are also compelled to mechanize their
mines and reduce their prices.
In a highly monopolized industry like steel or railroads or
telephones, increased productivity does not result in lower
prices. Take the telephone industry. Enormous increases in
productivity have been made in all branches of the telephone
industry over the last quarter of a century. But a telephone
call was a nickel twent y-five years ago. It still costs a nickel
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today. Similal)Y in the railroad, alulninu111 and other 'lnonopolized industries. The lower labor cost per unit of production
is not passed on in any form-either in lower prices or in
higher wages. It goes into the profit column of the monopolists.
And the fact is that the monopolists already control the
overwhelming bulk "Of American industry. The war enormously increased monopoly con~rol over the economic life of
the country; Even less than previously in the hist9ry -of our
country will increased productivity tend to reflect itself in
lower prices~
The worker will not automatically get a bigger piece of
pie merely by baking a bigger pie. Whether the pie is big or .
. .small, his share will be as big as he is strong enough to force
the capitalists to give him.

2. The Production Wage Policy
"Don't ask for wage increases. Prices haven't co-me down
because despite increased productivity actual production is
not yet hitting on all cylinders. Not enough autos, refrigerators and other articles have actually been produced," the corporations say. "Wait till production gets back to full speed.
Then supply and demand will bring prices down, and
your real wages will increase."
But, as we saw earlier, supply and demand didn't bring
prices down between 1922 and 1929. Every year the supply
increased. Levels of production were surpassed year after year
until in 1929 they reached-for that time-an all-time high.
But still prices did not come down. They actually increased
somewhat between 1922 and 19 29. Then .they did come down
-with a <;rash that shook the world. Even then, the monopolies prevented prices from going down as far as they should
have by deliberately destroying large supplies of goods. They
dumped oranges into the Pacific Ocean and burned tons of
coffee to prevent prices from falling still further.
The only trouble was that when prices came tumbling down
after th~ crash of 1929 the workers didn't have any .wa·ges to
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buy anything at those low prices. They lost their jobs-17 million of them. They stood on street corners selling apples at
the new low price of 5 cents each. They stood on soup lines to
get a free bowl of low-priced soup. They lived in Hoovervilles
made out of low-priced wooden crates. They travelled around
the country looking for jobs in low-priced freight cars.
That's how our friend, the-good old law of supply and demand, may bring prices down again. Already, the war-time
savings of America's workers have been exhaus~ed. Buying
continues at a fairly high level because sections of the middle
class still have some extra money to spend. When that becomes
exhausted, then the "demand" which is already falling will
fall still further, and the "supply" will crash down on the .
. heads of the entire country.
Then, those -w ho have the whole "supply" will suddenly
discover that the supply was bigger all along than the demand.
They will discover that their warehouses were stacked all
along with "supply" for which there was no demand. They
will discover that there was an overproduction of everything.
Today they say the trouble is that the demand is bigger
than the supply. Tomorrow, when the crash comes, it will be
seen that the trouble was just the opposite-the supply was
already bigger than the demand. That is why crises take place
regularly under capitalism. They are always crises of relative
overproduction-crises which take place qecause supplies are
always manufactured ~Tithout regard to demand and therefore
in excess of demand.
If prices were automatically regulated by supply and demand, the price of commodities should already be way down.
Invefltories-that is, unsold products stacked up in warehouses
and factories-have already reached the all-time high of close to
forty billion dollars. The capitalists themselves are b·ecoming
frightened. But that doesn't stop prices in general from continuing to increase, even though a few items may decline from
their hIghest point. Obviously supply and demand can't

be
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relied upon to bring prices 'do\vn and thus increase real wages.

3. Wages and Crises
"Don't ask us for wage i~creases because that will result in
a crisis or depression. When wages go up, prices have to go
up. When prices go up, less people can buy goods. Therefore,
manufacturers have to stop producing. They lay workers off
and a depression starts."
That's what the corpora.tions say.
But it's false.
,High wages do not cause crises or depressions.
In the first place, we have seen that wage increases do not
cause price increases. So, if high prices cause a crisis or depression, high wages are not responsible for it.
In the second place, crises and depressions can C:tnd do break
out even when prices are not "high" in the sen~ we speak of
high prices today. For example, there were no high prices comparable in any way to the present during 1935 or 1936.
despite ~his, a depression took place during the summer of
1937 which threw millions of workers out of jobs.
In the third place, high wages-regardless of prices-do not
, cause a crisis for any other reason either. Wages w:ere not
especially high during 1935 or 1936, but the depression of 1937
broke out anyway.
Even more, as we saw earlier from the figures of the National
Industrial Conference Board, wages remained at practically
the same level bet~een 1924, and 1929. Average hourly earnings of workers in twenty-five different manufacturing industries were 56 cents an hour in 1924 and 59 cents an hour in
1929. An insignificant increase. Yet - in 1929 the worst crisis
in the history of the world broke out.
/
Obviously, high wages or wage increases did not cause that
crISIS.

N either will wage increases be responsible for .the crisis
which even capitalist economists admit is inevitable toward
the end of 1947 or t~e beginning of 1948.
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In fact, if w~ges are not raised, the crisis will come mote
quickly. It will be more catastrophic when it does come. And
the workers will suffer more heavily from the ravages of the
crisis if their wages are kept down now and if prices continue
at the present outrageous levels.
In fact, the present low wages are speeding up the outbreak
of the crisis and creating conditions which will make the crisis
deeper when it does come.
Crises have always taken place regularly under capitalism.
The only way to abolish crises is to abo1ish the cause of crises
-the capitalist system.
An increase in wages will, however, retard the outbreak of
the crisis. It will put workers in a better position to withstand
the worst ravages of the crisis. Therefore, precisely because a
crisis is around the corner, workers must fight harder for wage
increases.
,
It is clear from everything that has been said that labor must
fight for higher wages. Unless it does, its real wages and there, fore its standard of living will be constantly reduced even below the extremely low level at which it is now.
But what policy should guide labor's fight for higher wages?
This is an extremely important question.

4. The Cost of Living Approach
At the present moment, the labor movement is demanding
wage increases' to meet the increased cost of living since January, 1945.
.
This demand is absolutely correct.
If labor did not demand such wage increases, i~ would signify its willingness to accept a cut in its real wages, that is,
in what a worker can ac.;tually buy with the money wages he
gets. If not 'resisted, the low real wages today would be only
the beginning of continued driving down of real ·wages. The
working class as a whole would be progressive~y depressed ever
\
closer to the level of paupers.
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But should tlie wage policy of the -labor movement be based
on this cost of living approach?
In our opinion, it should not. Such an approach assumes
that the standard of living as it existed in January, 1945 was
acceptable to labor and that labor is interested only in maintaining that standard of living.
But the labor movement can never be satisfied with the
standard of living it had in January, 1945.
The .Heller Committee of the University of California
worked out a budget which it considered as a minimum requirement for health and decency. According to this budget,
in 1941, a family of four would have needed $2,°42 a year,
but average earnings of a worker in manufacturing were only
$1,604 a year. In other words, the standard of living of the
average worker in 1941 was below what was required for a
minimum standard of health and decency.
According to the Heller Committee standards, a family of
four today needs approximately $70 a week to maintain a
minimum health and decency.21
We see from this that even if the labor movement won wage
increases which would make up for the advance in the. cost ·o f
living, it would still be lower than w'hat is required for a
minimum of decency.
That is why the cost of living approach cannot be the basis
for the wage policy of the labor movement.
But that is exactly what is done by the Trotskyites with
their infamous "escalator c~ause" wage policy. According to
this escalator clause, the wage standard is determined by what
the cost of living was at a certain date. Then, whenever prices
increase by three per cent wages are adjusted upwards to meet
the increased cost of living. In other words, the standard of
Hving of the worker would be fixed by contract to a certain
level.
The labor movement must reject such a wage policy. It is
a wage policy which takes for granted that the standard of
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living either now or at any time in the past is, or 'vas, a gC?od
one which requires only to be maintained.
The Heller Committee report shows that this is false even
by the most conservative estimates of what a decent standard
of living should be.

5. The Ahility-to-Pay Approach
Another incorrect approach is known as the "ability to pay"
'wage policy. According to this policy, the labor movement
should make its wage demands on the basis of what the corporations are able to pay.
Now, in the first place, ,vorkers can never really determine
what the level of an · employer's profit is. The bosses have
become so expert at concealing their profits that the Income
Tax Division of the Treasury Department has to employ a
whole army of lawyers, accountants and detectives to uncover
all the tricks the bosses use to conceal their actual profits in
order to cut down their taxes. And even they can't uncover
all the fraud that is practiced.
How in the world will the labor movement ever be able to
determine how much profit a corporation has made and therefore how much it is "able" to pay?
Walter Reuther's demand that General Motors "open its
books" was based on this "ability to pay" theory. But what
good would it have done the auto workers if the books had
been opened? There are a thousand ways of concealing profits
that the "books" would never show.
In the. second place, a wage policy based on "ability" of
the employer to pay would destroy the possibility of maintaining or achieving one of the most important de~ands of the
trade unions-un' form, industry-wide wage rates.
It is well known that different employers in the same industry make different rates and amount~ of profits. Some employers, the so-called "marginal employers," make the lowest
profits~ Others make higher profits.
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According to the "ability to pay" approach, wage rates in
the so-called "marginal" plants would have to be lower than
those in others. Similarly, when wage increases are demanded~
smaller wage raises would haye to be demanded from them
than from the others.
But this would result in one of two things:
1) Either it ~ould bring the uniform, industry-wide wage
scale down to the low level which the so-called "marginal'~
employers is "able" to payor,
2) There could not be a uniform, industry-wide wage scale.
In the third place, the "ability to p~y" approach means that
labor accepts the principle that wages should be cut whenever
a certain employer begins to make less profit. It means acceptance ' of the principle that labor should voluntarily accept
wage cuts in times of crisis or depression because the employer
makes less profit and, hence, ha less "ability" to pay.
In fact, the "ability to pay" approach is traditionally the
approach that the employer has used in his negotiations with
unions because it serves his interests. The fact that it seems,
at the moment, to strengthen labor's case for a wage increase
is misleading. If the 'labor movement should make the em- •
. ployer's "ability to pay" the basis for its wage policy-then the
chickens will come home to roost when the crisis breaks.
What will the labor movement do when the employers use
the "ability to pay" theory a year from now to justify their
demand for wage cuts? If it bases its claim to wage raises now
on "ability to pay," it is helping pave the way for the employers to cut wages a year from now.

6. What Should Guide Labor's Wage Policy?
One consideration above all must guide the labor movement in its wage struggles. It must at all times aim to secure
. an ever-higher standard of living for the mass of workers.
As we have seen, the present standard of living of the mass
of American workers is below what is required, according to
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the Heller Committee, for a minimum of health and decency.
Hence, the wage demands of the labor movement at the
present time are fully justified and absolutely necessary if
labor is to move forward to win a higher standard of living
than has existed in the past.
As a matter of fact, even should the present wage demands
of the labor movement be fully won, the resulting standard of
living would still be below that indicated in the Heller Commi t tee report.
And even if the labor movement won wage increases which
would bring i,ts living standards up to that proposed by the
Heller Committee, that could not be considered an upper
limit. What is sacred about the Heller Committee standard
of living? Why should the working class live at a standard
'which is based on a minimum of decency? Why should it not
live at a .s tandard which 'is higher tha~ a minimum for health
and decency?
. It should, and it must.
The wage policy of the labor'" movement · should be such
that it aims constantly at raising the standard of living of all
• ,vorkers.
!
How high should it try to r~ise it?
As high as it is strong enough to do!
Only the extent of unity and strength of the organized labor
movement, and the strength of the allies it can win to support
its struggles, should determine the wage demands of the labor
movement.
The more highly organized the American workers are, the
closer the ties of labor with the poor farmers, the Negro
people and the city middle classes, the more it will be able
to demand and win.
In conducting its wage struggles, labor must develop a
many-sided approach-direct wage increases, increased minimum wage rates, portal-to-portal pay, abolition of wage rate
inequities within plants, as well as geographic wages differ-'
I

entials. It must fight .to establish, wherever possible, -the guaranteed annual wage.
In c:onducting its wage struggles, labor must at all times
remember that many factors besides money wages determine
the living standards of the masses. Hence, it .must accompany
its direct wage struggles with an organized struggle on the
political front for increasing all forms of social insurance, for
shifting the burden of taxation £ro~ the wage earner and the ·
lower middle class to the wealthy and the corporations, for
measur~s to curb the monopolies and, among other things, to
expose and break up monopoly price-fixing arrangements. It
must accompany its struggle for wage increases with a determined effort to eliminate the scandalous north-south wage
differential and, above all, the discrimination against Negro
workers in wage rates. It must accompany its struggles for wage
increases with a determined struggle to shorten the wor~ week
without reduction in pay.
Only a successful struggle along such lines will enable the
labor movement to advance in the direction of constantly raising the standard of living of the great mass of workers.
How high can wages be raised if the labor movement has a
correct wage policy? Can it, by increasing its organization and
fig4ting capacity, raise wages indefinitely?
To answer this question, it is first of c;tll necessary to understand what wages are.

7. What Are Wages?
When your employer gives you a certain sum of money
every week as wages, he is really buying something from you.
He buys something from you when he pays you wages just
as he buys something from a dealer when he pays him for raw . materials.
..
But what do you sell your employer in ret·urn for your
wages?
Suppose you are -a miner. Do you sell coal to your employer
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in return for your wages? Of course not. If you are an auto
'worker, do you sell autos to your employer in return for your
wages? If you are a shoe "worker do you sell shoes to your employer in return for your wages? Of course not.
You don't have any coal or autos or shoes to sell.
There is only one thing which the miner, the auto worker,
the shoe worker or any other kind of worker has that he can
sell. That o.ne thing is his ability to wOTk.
You sell your ability to work,. and, in return,
you get your
l
wages.
.
Your wages are the price of your ability to work. This price
is determined in the same way that all other prices are determined-by value.
But what determines the value of your ability to work?
The same thing which determines the value of any other com- modity-the nu~ber of hours of work which it takes to produce it.
To produce your ability to work, you must have at lea t
enough food, clothing and shelter to keep on living.
Therefore, the wages of the worker are determined first of
all by the value of what he needs physically to keep on living
so he can be able to work. That is the minimum below which
wages cannot fall-at least not permanently.
But wages may be higher than this minimum.
Historical and social conditions playa decisive role in determining whether they actually will be higher than this
physical minimum. Historical conditions in the United States
are such that a relatively higher standard of living was established than in other capitalist countries. In other words, what
the workers in the United States consider necessary to eat,
wear, live in to be able to work is different than in other countries. Therefore, the general level of wages is relatively higher
in the United States than in these other countries. But even
in the United States historical and s~cial conditions have given
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rise to different standards of living in different parts of the
country. This accounts for the differential in wage levels between north and south over many decades.
What wages actually will be at any period is therefore
determined by the struggle of the trade unions against
the efforts of employers to lower commonly accepted standards of living. But while an ever stronger labor movemen can raise wages without regard to any "ability" of
the employers to pay, it can raise wages only within certain
limits. These limits are fixed by the nature of the capitalist
system as a profit system. Every increase in wages cuts down
profits. The more wages cut into profits, the more desperately
the capitalist class uses every~ weapon at its command to keep
wages down and lower them still further. It introduces new
labor-saving machinery which throws workers out of jobs
and creates a permanent army of unemployed. This army of
'u nemployed workers is then used as a weapon to club the
employed workers into accepting lower wages or not fighting
for higher wages.
Not only that. Periodic economic crises are an inevitable
feature of capitalist society.· They occur regularly, independently of the will of the capitalist or worker. They result in
the shutting down of factories, mines, mills and offices for
whole periods of time. Workers are completely thrown out of
their jobs by the millions and thus cut off frotu the possibility
of earning any wages-high or low.
Thus, the profit system, by the very nature of its functioning,
puts a limit to the level to which wages can be raised even by
the most stubborn organization and struggle. Under capitalism, wages can never be raised to the point where they
threaten the actual existence of the capitalist system itself.
Does this mean that it is useless for the worker to fight for
higher wages? Of course not. As Karl Marx said:
. . . the very developluent of modern industry must
turn the scale in favor of the capitalist

progressiv~ly
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· against the working men, and '... consequently the gen.' eral . tendepcy of capitalistic production 'is not to raise,
but to sink the average standard of wages, 'or to push the
value of labor more or less to its minimum limit. Such
being the tendency of things in this system, is this to say
that the working class ought to renounce their resistance
against the encroachments of capital and abandon their
attempt at making the best of the occasional chances for
their temporary improvement? If they did, they would be
degraded to one level mass of broken-down wretches past
salvation. I think I have shown that their struggles for the
standard of wages are incidents inseparable from the
whole wages system~ that in 99 cases out of 100 their efforts at 'raising wages are only efforts at maintaining the
given value of labor and that the necessity of debating
, . their price with the capitalist is inherent to their condition of having to sell themselves as commodities. By cowardly giving way in their everyday conflict with capital,
they would certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating of any larger movement. 22 ,
The labor movement must continually fight for higher
wages. And in this fight it must base its wage P9licy upon the
need for continually raising its standard of living to new
heights. Only this perspective, as well as the strength of its
organization and the support it gets' from its friends and allies,
should determine the specific wage demands of the labor
movement.
At the same time, the labor movement must begin to understand. that its struggle for higher wages and against the efforts
of the capitalists to lower living standards is a $truggle w~lch
can be carried on only within certain limits and which can
never permanently solve its problems. The fundamental cause
of the poverty, misery and degradation of the great mass of
workers is the capitalist systenl itself. The labor II!0vement
must begin to understand that, necessary as the fight for high
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wages is, it is not enough. It must advance beyond" the limitations of this economic struggle' and set itself the political goal
of abolishing the capitalist system. It must set itself the lofty
aim of establishing socialism in the United States as the only
final and permanent solution of all its problems.
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